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Recent Developments

Kostelec v. State:

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Koste/ec v.
State, 348 Md. 230, 703 A.2d
160 (1997), held that Md. Ann.
Code art. 27, section 551(a)
(1996 RepL VoL), which
authorizes search warrants,
does not permit the issuance of
anticipatory search warrants. In
so holding, the court implied
that it was the duty of the
legislature to amend the statute
to validate search warrants
based upon probable cause
that sometime in the future
evidence of a crime would be
found at a specified location.
In April of 1995, Howard
County Police seized a Federal
Express package containing
approximately forty ounces of
liquid phencyclidine (UpCP").
Howard County Police made a
controlled delivery of the
package to the Baltimore
address and arrested Randal
Lucabaugh
(ULucabaugh").
Lucabaugh was arrested when
he attempted to leave with the
package. He stated that part of
the package belonged to
Roarke Boulton (UBoulton") who
lived in Elkridge, Maryland.
Police later determined that
Boulton lived with Joseph
Kostelec
(UKostelec"),
the
owner of the residence.
Lucabaugh cooperated with the
authorities and telephoned
Boulton to assure him that a
friend would deliver the
package.
Howard
County
Police
obtained an anticipatory search
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and seizure warrant based upon
a supporting affidavit.
The
affidavit stated the police would
only execute the warrant if: 1) a
member of the Howard County
Police Department presented
the package for delivery; 2)
someone inside the residence
accepted the package; 3) the
police observed the individual
carry the package into the
residence; and 4) the police
conducted constant surveillance
of the residence. On April 5,
1995, Kostelec accepted the
package on behalf of Boulton.
An electronic device alerted the
police that the package was
opened and the police made a
no-knock entry. Kostelec was
arrested and charged with
several drug related offenses.
Kostelec challenged the
search warrant, contending that
the affidavit failed to allege facts
presently in existence which
indicated a crime was being
committed. The Circuit Court
for Howard County denied
Kostelec's motion to suppress

on the grounds that the
anticipatory search warrant did
not
violate
Kostelec's
constitutional rights. Kostelec
was convicted of various
charges and sentenced to five
years without parole. The Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the decision and held
that the language of section
551 (a) could be read to allow
the requisite probable cause
finding at the time the warrant
was executed. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to determine: 1)
551 (a)
whether
section
permitted anticipatory search
warrants;
2)
whether
anticipatory search warrants
were constitutional; and 3)
whether suppression of the
evidence was the appropriate
remedy.
The court began its analysis
by reviewing the I"nguage of
section 551 (a). Koste/ec at
236-37, 703 A.2d at 163. To
issue a search warrant the
statute requires Uthat there is
probable cause . . . to believe
that any misdemeanor or felony
is being committed . . . or that
any property subject to seizure
. . . is situated or located . . . in
or on any such building .... "
Id. at 236, 703 A.2d at 163
(quoting section 551 (a». The
court disagreed with the
intermediate
court's
interpretation and emphasized
that the present tense language
of the statute referred to the
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time when the police applied for
the warrant, not when the
warrant was executed. Id.
The court next examined
prior case law on the subject of
anticipatory search warrants.
Id. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163-64.
In a previous decision, the court
of special appeals examined
section 551 (a) and concluded
that probable cause to support
a search warrant must be
based on facts that the
evidence of the crime is upon
the person or premises to be
searched. Id. at 237, 703 A.2d
at 163 (citing Salmon v. State,
2 Md. App. 513, 235 A.2d 758
(1967)). Furthermore, the court
of appeals earlier held that
551 (a)
required
section
probable cause that a crime has
been or "is being committed . .
. and . . . is located upon" the
person or premises to be
searched. Id. at 237,703 A.2d
at 163-64 (quoting State v.
Intercontinental, Ltd., 302 Md.
132, 486 A.2d 174 (1985)).
The court determined the literal
meaning of the statute was that
evidence must be present at
the time the judge issues the
warrant. Id. at 236, 703 A.2d at
163. The court concluded that
the search warrant was not
authorized because section
551 (a)
does
not
permit
antiCipatory search warrants
based on future evidence of a
crime. Id. at 238, 703 A.2d at
164.
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Next, the court examined
constitutionality
of
the
antiCipatory search warrants.
Id. The State argued that the
majority of states with statutes
similar to section 551 (a) have
concluded antiCipatory search
warrants are constitutional. Id.
The court, however, avoided
addressing those states which
permittedanticipatory
search
and
examined
warrants,
Alabama, Colorado and Iowa
case law which supported the
proposition that legislative intent
precluded
issuance
of
antiCipatory search warrants.
Id. at 238-40, 703 A.2d at 16465. The court noted that in
1990, the present tense
language of Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 41(a)(1),
which governs federal search
specifically
warrants,
was
omitted to permit antiCipatory
search warrants. Id. at 239,
703
A.2d
at
164-65.
Accordingly,
the
court
concluded that the search
warrant issued in the case at
bar was not authorized by
section 551 (a) because the
present tense language was still
contained in the Maryland
statute. Id. at 240, 703 A.2d at
165.
Having decided upon the
invalidity of the search warrant,
the court next addressed the
issue of whether suppression
was the appropriate remedy.
Id. at 240-41, 703 A.2d at 165.

The court of appeals standard
of review is limited to only those
issues raised in the petition for
certiorari or any cross-petition
for certiorari. Id. at 242, 703
A.2d at 166. Kostelec argued
suppression
was
the
appropriate remedy throughout
the appeals process. Id. at
241, 703 A.2d at 165. Noting
that the State failed to address
the issue of suppression until its
brief to the court of appeals, the
court held that because both
parties assumed suppression
was the appropriate remedy in
the event of a section 551 (a)
violation, Kostelec's motion to
suppress should be granted.
Id. at 242-43, 703 A.2d at 166.
In Kostelec v. State, the
court held that Maryland law did
not authorize the issuance of
antiCipatory search warrants.
The refusal to recognize
antiCipatory search warrants
severely
impairs
the
investigatory power of law
enforcement
officials
in
Maryland. In deciding this case
of statutory construction, the
court intimated that it was up to
the legislature to create the
appropriate language to permit
antiCipatory search warrants.
Because a controlled delivery is
an important law enforcement
tool, it is imperative that the
legislature amend the statute to
allow
the
issuance
of
antiCipatory search warrants.

